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Abstract 
Since the signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
the Straits of Malacca have been identified as a “hot spot” for whole range of maritime 
security threats, including human trafficking and people smuggling. As a consequence, 
Indonesia’s national and local authorities have been under immense pressure from the 
international community to develop and implement programmes that address these concerns. 
Multilateral agencies and other donor organizations have also pumped millions of dollars into 
counter-trafficking and anti-smuggling programmes in the Riau Islands. Much of the 
groundwork for both government and international initiatives is done by NGOs, most of 
which work to identify and assist repatriated migrant workers or victims of trafficking. In one 
case, however, a Batam-based NGO has gone far beyond this well-trodden path, developing a 
system to apprehend undocumented labour migrants who use the services of people 
smugglers to return to Indonesia without passing through immigration. This article examines 
the case of Gerakan Anti-Trafficking (Anti-Trafficking Movement, GAT) and its 
implications for our understanding of emerging modes of non-state involvement in border 
regulation. 
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Indonesia is made up of over 17,000 islands. With over 54,000 kilometres of coastline, its 
national borders are mainly at sea. Managing these borders has proven to be a difficult 
exercise for a number of reasons. First, the complex legal issues that surround archipelagic 
states, and negotiations over the precise location of Indonesia’s international boundaries, has 
meant that some of Indonesia’s borders remain the subject of ongoing legal contestation.1 A 
second associated issue concerns the mapping of exclusive economic zones (EEZ), 
particularly in relation to Indonesia’s border with Australia, and its impact on the livelihoods 
of Indonesian fishers.2 Third, fiscal and technological constraints have limited the capacity of 
the Indonesian authorities to police its borders. For example, it has been widely reported that 
the lack of funding, maintenance and spare parts has meant that the navy has few serviceable 
vessels and that no more than 25 naval ships are operational at any one time.3 
The lack of political will or wherewithal to secure the border has meant that Indonesia is 
regarded internationally as a “hotspot” for smuggling (of goods, drugs, people and 
contraband), human trafficking, piracy and sea robbery, and terrorism.4 These problems are 
increasingly being addressed through a range of bilateral and multilateral agreements and 
joint policing initiatives with Indonesia’s nearest neighbours. In the Straits of Malacca, for 
example, security responses to trafficking and irregular migrant flows have converged with 
the increasingly visible presence of navy and customs boats as a result of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and coordinated counter-piracy initiatives between Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore.5 However, the presence of the navy in the Straits owing to these 
initiatives has not led to a reduction in “illegal” flows across this part of the border. 
Malaysian people smugglers — many of them bringing into Indonesia returning Indonesian 
migrant workers not in possession of formal paperwork — have established close connections 
with the Indonesian navy’s local commands, which at times actively facilitate their 
landings.6 While this may be regarded as a form of corruption, the navy’s involvement with 
people smugglers nonetheless ensures an orderly arrival process for the thousands of 
Indonesian citizens who return by sea every year without passing through a recognized entry 
port. 
Despite the large numbers of arrivals, the Directorate-General of Immigration has shown 
little interest in Indonesian nationals returning illegally by sea. Instead, over time much of the 
work of assisting undocumented labour migrants returning to Indonesia has been undertaken 
by NGOs and intergovernmental organizations involved in counter-trafficking 
activities.7 Intergovernmental organizations such as the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), the International Labour Office (ILO), and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) play a significant role in assisting undocumented 
labour migrants, refugees and displaced persons in the region. NGOs, trade unions and 
church groups are also very active in providing welfare and labour rights assistance to 
returning undocumented labour migrants and refugees. Such groups, however, are rarely 
involved in border security and/or regulation. The direct involvement of NGOs in regulating 
cross-border migration thus signals a significant shift in the ways that the non-government 
sector has hitherto been involved in managing labour flows in the region. 
This paper presents the case of Gerakan Anti-Trafficking (Anti-Trafficking Movement, 
GAT), a counter-trafficking NGO operating on the island of Batam. GAT is very different 
from other counter-trafficking NGOs. Instead of focusing on victim identification and 
repatriation assistance, it has become involved in the monitoring or apprehension of 
undocumented labour migrants who use the services of people smugglers to return to 
Indonesia without passing through an immigration checkpoint. GAT’s modus operandi is also 
very different from other cases where the state has consciously outsourced aspects of 
immigration control to private companies, either through a combination of public–private 
partnerships or direct outsourcing. The paper begins with an overview of the literature on 
non-state involvement in border regulation, before turning to the case study and its 
implications for attempts to maintain the integrity of the border.8 It concludes that, while 
undoubtedly novel, GAT’s activities ultimately neither support the activities of the state nor 
challenge the legitimacy and efficacy of its border protocols because GAT operates in a space 
in which the state chooses to be absent. 
Outsourcing border control 
Border security is commonly regarded as the responsibility of the state and its agencies. 
However, where once the state was responsible for making decisions about who entered its 
territory, when and where they entered, and for how long, now these decisions are often the 
outcome of complex negotiations between national and international legal and regulatory 
regimes in which non-state actors are playing an increasingly significant role. 
Much of the scholarly research on non-state involvement in border regulation has focused on 
Europe, North America and Australia, where non-state actors are involved in border 
regulation as receiving countries seek to “outsource” or “externalise” control so that 
unwanted migrants do not arrive or are easily identified and removed. Such actors include 
airlines and other transport providers, employer groups and private security firms. Writing 
about the European Union (EU), Gallya Lahav argues that these non-state bodies are “either 
incorporated by European states, or ‘privatized’ in the sense that their functions have evolved 
from a contractual relation into becoming de facto regulators themselves”.9 For example, the 
abolition of passport controls has been achieved by legislation that makes transport or carrier 
companies liable to check that passengers possess appropriate travel documents and are 
eligible to enter member states. This regulatory framework, which Aristide Zolberg refers to 
as a form of “remote control” migration policy, has been in place since the early part of the 
twentieth century.10 But since the late 1980s the laws have been strengthened and the 
responsibilities placed on carriers have increased, primarily in response to the increasing 
number of “jet age” asylum-seekers.11 The focus has shifted towards deterrence before entry 
rather than detention after arrival — a process that Lahav describes as the virtual extension of 
the state’s borders “outwards”.12 As a consequence, the number of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements between individual countries has increased tenfold as private actors are 
increasingly being called upon to carry the burden of regulation. In the case of the EU, for 
example, the stringent passport, visa and identity checks of passengers undertaken by airline 
companies prior to departure have meant that the absence of passport control within the 
Schengen Area of the EU is largely irrelevant. 
Migration regulation is carried out not only beyond the border. Private sector employers and 
enterprises have also taken on roles associated with monitoring and regulating “illegals” 
within the borders of the nation-state. In many countries, governments require employers and 
employer groups to take responsibility for monitoring and addressing the presence of 
undocumented labour migrants in the workplace. Such roles are enforced through fines and 
other punitive actions against employers found to be employing “illegal” migrants. In some 
cases, these roles have been outsourced to private labour inspection agencies.13 Private firms 
are also increasingly involved in the management of migrants detained or imprisoned on 
account of immigration infringements: in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australia, detention centres are contracted out to private for-profit security companies.14 This 
outsourcing of immigration enforcement can come at the expense of migrants’ welfare. In 
Australia, for example, there has been considerable public concern about the conditions in 
privately run detention facilities and particularly the ability of private security firms to 
provide for the physical and mental health of detainees.15 
While it may be tempting to view the involvement of private enterprise in migration 
regulation as a sign of the state’s failure to manage its borders, these developments can 
equally be seen as constituting a shift in modes of regulation rather than a fundamental 
change in state function.16 Migration control is a politically fraught arena. Shifting the 
implementation of immigration policy to private, local or international arrangements can be 
an effective strategy for governments that wish to distance themselves from unpopular 
policies and practices. Successful public–private partnerships can also be a means to enhance 
a state’s reputation for border control and migration management. As Lahav argues, that 
rather than displacing the state, such “processes of devolution aim to enhance the political 
capacity of states to regulate migration, to make states more flexible and adaptable to all 
types of migration pressures, to shift the focus of responsiveness, and to generate more 
effective state legitimacy”.17 As a consequence of these hybrid public-private partnerships, 
“the intersections between public and private are becoming increasingly blurred and hard to 
disentangle, determining where private involvement begins and where public authority ends 
becomes likewise difficult”.18  
Privatized regulatory strategies are also attractive to governments because they supplement 
the capacity of overworked and under-resourced state agencies. As such, they may be seen as 
an extension of the shift towards privatization and outsourcing in other sectors, notably health 
and prisons. When it comes to immigration, privatization is not simply a matter of cost 
savings. As Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen argues, prevention at the point of departure 
overcomes the state’s legal obligation to protect refugees and asylum seekers since it involves 
an encounter between two private parties, neither of which is directly responsible under 
international refugee and human rights law.19 Similarly, while states maintain a responsibility 
to oversee conditions in privatized detention centres, they can partially absolve themselves of 
their duty of care towards inmates by exercising that responsibility at arm’s length. In both 
cases, outsourcing at least in part circumvents the need to uphold the international laws and 
conventions that protect the rights of refugees and migrants. 
However, private enterprises are not the only non-state actors involved in the management of 
migration within the nation-state. The increasing securitization of border regulation and 
migration management has seen immigration officials overwhelmingly preoccupied with 
enforcement issues rather than information and service provision. This gap has been filled by 
churches, trade unions and NGOs that provide legal services and education/information 
programmes.20 Many run shelters to house migrant workers, provide legal advice about 
immigration law and assist migrants to obtain temporary visas or permanent residency, or 
provide repatriation assistance. While the majority of these organizations would not 
characterize their activities as an extension of the state’s border security regime, their work 
has become an essential component of the state’s migration management model. This work, 
however, is not directly linked to border security or regulation — functions that remain 
within the purview of the state and its affiliated or contracted agencies. In this light, Gerakan 
Anti-Trafficking’s direct involvement in border regulation is highly unusual, and most salient 
to debates about non-state actors and border security. 
Non-state actors and border control in Indonesia’s Riau islands 
The Riau Islands lie in the Straits of Malacca to the northeast of Sumatra and directly south 
of Singapore (see Figure 1). Riau Islands Province (Provinsi Kepulauan Riau, Kepri) consists 
of the main islands of Bintan, Batam, Karimun (collectively known as the Riau Islands), 
along with Natuna and Lingga and many other smaller islands and islets. The islands are the 
focus of considerable international and national attention because of their strategic location 
within one of the world’s busiest shipping straits. With more than 75,000 ships passing 
through the straits each year, carrying more than one-third of global trade and two-thirds of 
the world’s liquefied natural gas,21 the Straits are one of the world’s busiest waterways. They 
are of strategic importance not only to the economies of the littoral states, but also to 
countries such as China, which rely on the constant flow of oil and other resources through 
Southeast Asia.22 Piracy, which thrived during the pre-colonial and colonial eras, has long 
been a matter of international concern in these waters. The narrowness of the straits, 
combined with their role as a key international shipping lane, has also given rise to concerns 
about terrorist activities, including “floating bombs” that could be used to target Singapore’s 
harbour and oil refineries.23 The Straits are also the site of a flourishing economy of 
smuggling involving cross-border trade deemed illegal by governments on one or more sides 
of the border.24 
Figure 1. Indonesia’s Riau Islands 
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Since the signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
in 2000, the Straits of Malacca have been identified as a “hot spot” for human trafficking and 
people smuggling. Indonesia’s national and local authorities are under immense pressure 
from the country’s regional neighbours to develop and implement programmes that address 
these interconnected problems. The Australian government, in particular, is concerned 
primarily with Indonesia’s role as a transit site for those seeking asylum in Australia. The 
majority of these come from Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka, and arrive via boat from 
Malaysia and spend time in different parts of Indonesia en route to Australia. To address 
domestic political concerns over the arrival of these “boat people”, the Australian 
government has provided Indonesia with development assistance aid in the form of patrol 
boats, surveillance aircraft and communications equipment to expand Indonesia’s ability to 
detect and disrupt people smuggling. It has also provided funds to assist in the construction of 
detention facilities, including a detention centre in the Riau Islands.25 
However, asylum seekers are not the only “illegals” in the Straits. The Riau Islands are a 
strategic hub for people-smuggling syndicates that operate throughout Indonesia in order to 
convey Indonesian workers to and from factories and plantations in Malaysia.26 Since the late 
1990s, both Singapore and Malaysia have stepped up surveillance to prevent unauthorized 
labour migrants from attempting to cross the border with or without passports in search of 
work. In the case of Singapore, increased pressure on the border led to heightened 
immigration controls at major checkpoints in the Harbour Front and Tanah Merah terminals 
used by ferry services from the Riau Islands. These efforts appear to have had some success 
in reducing the numbers of people attempting to enter Singapore by sea.27 Malaysian attempts 
to stem the flow of undocumented labour migrants from Indonesia have been much less 
successful, in part because of a lack of commitment and wherewithal on the Malaysian side. 
Hundreds of thousands of Indonesians cross into Malaysia without proper documentation to 
live and work there. These irregular migration flows are typically dealt with through periodic 
forced “sweeping” and repatriation of undocumented labour migrants living in Malaysia 
rather than by interception at the border as they come in or out.28 
In addition to being an embarkation point, the Riau islands are also the nearest point of 
repatriation for returning Indonesian workers.29 Many Indonesians caught working illegally 
in Malaysia are deported during crackdowns on undocumented workers. Once in Indonesia, 
these returnees are the focus of both local government initiatives to facilitate deported 
migrant workers’ return to their province of origin and of local NGOs’ counter-trafficking 
efforts. Although the international agenda has been driven largely by a concern with 
trafficking for sexual exploitation, one of the most notable features of the Indonesian anti-
trafficking landscape, particularly in the Riau Islands, is the relatively minor position 
accorded to the issue of trafficking for sexual exploitation. In comparison, issues facing 
labour migrants (primarily women) are given priority.30 Multilateral agencies and other donor 
organizations have pumped millions of dollars into efforts to identify and assist “victims of 
trafficking” and to strengthen the monitoring and apprehension of traffickers. Local 
authorities, including police and immigration officers, have attended training courses offered 
through these programmes and devoted significant human and financial resources to the 
formulation of counter-trafficking strategies. 
Concerns about labour trafficking overlap with the logistics of managing workers expelled by 
Malaysia in its intermittent but large-scale campaigns against irregular migrant workers. The 
Riau Islands are one of a relatively small number of targeted points of return during these 
campaigns. In an attempt to deal with deportees, the provincial government established four 
holding centres in the mid-2000s with a combined capacity of 2,000 people in Batam, and up 
to 600 people in the provincial capital, Tanjung Pinang. In 2006 alone, 16,805 Indonesians 
passed through the Tanjung Pinang holding centre,31 where deportees arrive on a Thursday, 
and stay a maximum of three nights before being returned to their province of origin.32 In 
Batam, detainees stay for a maximum of two weeks. 
Irregular labour migrants who return of their own accord are seldom aware of these 
repatriation initiatives — and, if they are, most seek to avoid them. Even those who have 
experienced labour abuses in Malaysia or Singapore, or have been detained and punished 
before returning to Indonesia, generally wish to travel overseas again for work.33 To become 
caught up in government or NGO programmes and detained and returned home makes this 
goal more expensive and difficult. It is much more desirable to return overseas before being 
detected by either the Indonesian authorities or migrant labour NGOs, and without passing 
through an immigration post where inappropriate, outdated — or non-existent — paperwork 
may be noticed. Many migrant workers seeking to return to Indonesia without valid travel 
documents use the services of smugglers to avoid detection by either the Malaysian or 
Indonesian governments. When they do so, they land at one of the many “mouse” or “rat” 
ports (pelabuhan tikus) scattered through the Riau Islands. Unlike those labour migrants who 
are caught up in the Malaysian government’s deportation exercises and processed by the 
large holding centres on Batam and Bintan, these workers are of little interest to the 
Indonesian state. It is precisely these flows that Gerakan Anti-Trafficking seeks to regulate in 
the absence of any apparent official effort to do so. 
Gerakan Anti-Trafficking 
GAT was established in 2008 towards the end of a series of counter-trafficking initiatives 
supported by the IOM and USAID in the Riau Islands.34 It mostly deals with women and 
children who have been trafficked into sex work in the region’s large commercial sex 
industry, a focus that reflects the group’s sense of moral obligation to assist and protect the 
most vulnerable amongst the islands’ migrant workforce, but also a practical recognition that 
sex worker “victims” are the easiest to monitor and locate. This aspect of GAT’s work 
involves “search and rescue missions” to identify and save victims of trafficking working in 
brothels and other venues, such as karaoke bars. In cases where GAT staff believe they have 
enough evidence to achieve a conviction under Indonesia law, they prepare case information 
and hand it over to police on the proviso that they can continue to be involved in the case. 
They insist on working with the police in an attempt to overcome what they see as persistent 
and entrenched corruption, which sees many traffickers escape punishment. 
In addition to its work among sex workers, GAT is involved in monitoring labour-sending 
companies in Batam and identifying trafficking cases in the flows of irregular migrants 
returning through unofficial routes to Batam. GAT has also established a number of 
initiatives to address people smuggling, including of irregular Indonesian returnees, along 
Batam’s northern coast. Having routinely surveyed entry points for irregular arrivals on 
Batam, GAT staff identified seven major sites along the north coast. One popular landing site 
is Teluk Mata Ikan, a small village with a long history of involvement in illegal border 
crossings. Local villagers have smuggled goods and people across the border for decades. 
Smugglers have also used the village as a transit site en route to Malaysia, paying the local 
community Rp.1 million (US$105) per night to house prospective illegal migrants. 
Villagers began to report late night arrivals to the NGO after GAT ran a community 
awareness training programme about the illegality of abetting people smuggling and the 
punishments that the crime carries. Once it receives these reports, GAT workers travel out to 
the village to register the arrival at the make-shift registration centre established there for this 
purpose — a plywood hut with forty plastic chairs, a desk and a few office chairs. They 
collect the names and dates of birth of the returnees and send this information to all relevant 
government offices in the Riau Islands every three months. As part of this process, GAT 
workers also go through the bags of those who have arrived in a kind of “customs check” that 
aims to identify contraband goods such as illicit drugs and weapons. GAT also purchased a 
fingerprint scanner in order to collect fingerprint data to compare with biometric data 
contained in passports and other documents with the aim of gathering information about the 
number of times an individual had crossed the border illegally, whether he or she possesses a 
valid passport and where the passport was issued. 
GAT’s main aim in processing the arrival of returnees is to facilitate their return to their 
provinces of origin — thus bringing the undocumented labour migrants back into the very 
system they had sought to avoid by entering Indonesia illegally. GAT organizes 
accommodation for returnees in the village, as neither the police nor Ministry of Social 
Welfare have the resources to accommodate independent returnees. GAT workers then help 
to organize flights for the undocumented workers to return home, mostly to West Nusa 
Tenggara and East Java, and rent buses to transport them to the airport. Sometimes the police 
will intercept a bus and take the passengers to a police station to be processed. Usually, 
however, the police let them go once they realize that they are Indonesian citizens with 
tickets to return home. 
GAT has also sought to discourage villagers from facilitating irregular arrivals. In the village 
of Teluk Mata Ikan, the NGO developed a livelihood project to provide the community with 
an alternative source of income. For example, in February 2010, GAT received Rp.8 million 
($840) from the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare to run a training session to teach 
villagers how to make souvenirs out of seashells.35 According to the activists, the community 
began to accept GAT’s presence in the village after the head of the Rukun Warga (a local 
administrative unit) offered his support. In conjunction with the screening programme, 
GAT’s community development work in Teluk Mata Ikan saw a dramatic decline in the 
number of returnees using the village as an entry point, from 150 people per night, to 30–35 
per week. GAT is proud of this statistic, which it sees as a mark of its success.36  
GAT as an agent of border control 
Although GAT’s intervention effectively dovetails with programmes administered by other 
counter-trafficking NGOs in the Riau Islands, it is novel for two reasons. First, its relatively 
limited exposure to the internationally sponsored counter-trafficking programmes active in 
the islands for several years means that its purpose is framed less in the international 
discourse of the victimhood of trafficked persons.37 Instead, “illegal” returnees are viewed 
with some suspicion, as a problem to be dealt with rather than people to be “saved”. GAT 
activists claim to be motivated by a strong sense of national loyalty and a desire to protect the 
Indonesian nation from potential risks, a fact reflected in the NGO’s emphasis on 
documenting the identities of arrivals and searching their bags for contraband. 
Second, although the repatriation of returnees (which dominates the work of most local 
counter-trafficking NGOs) represents a significant part of GAT’s programme, its primary 
point of intervention is unique. Like counter-trafficking and migrant labour NGOs elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia, other counter-trafficking NGOs in the Riau Islands operate within a state-
sanctioned NGO service model, working in or with government-funded detention centres and 
shelters, or with the Indonesian embassy staff in neighbouring countries. By contrast, while 
GAT has personal and programmatic links to the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, 
its de facto immigration post operates completely independently of the Directorate-General of 
Immigration, which is responsible for processing border-crossers, and of the navy, which 
continues to be largely responsible for law enforcement at sea.38 
GAT activists attribute their decision to enter the arena of “border control” to the 
government’s failure to meet the demands of border security along this busy and strategically 
important border and feel that their activities help in a small way to fill this gap. Although the 
Indonesian central government has been under international pressure to more closely regulate 
cross-border movements, the issue of illegal cross-border entry has not been designated as a 
national security priority. Indonesia’s land and sea borders are very difficult to monitor and, 
as a consequence, the international border is very porous. The only group of illegal entrants 
who the government has shown much interest in are international terrorists; for several years 
after the al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001, posters displaying the names and images of 
known terrorists occupied prominent positions in ports and immigration facilities. Even its 
efforts to identify and apprehend asylum seekers are piecemeal, despite pressure and funding 
from neighbouring Australia. 
The state’s reluctance to address the problem of illegal returnees can also be attributed partly 
to demands on the human and financial resources available for the management of overseas 
labour migration. Government regulation of labour migrants is overwhelmingly oriented to 
outward flows and the central authorities are reluctant to devote resources to managing 
Indonesian citizens seeking to re-enter Indonesia without appropriate paperwork. While some 
efforts were made after the humanitarian crisis in the East Kalimantan town of Nunukan in 
2002 in the form of the provision of shelter and basic services for deportees,39 in general, the 
vast numbers of unregulated returnees receive no government attention at all.40 The lack of 
government attention is also a product of a general recognition that, even if undocumented, 
returning labour migrants seldom pose a security risk. Moreover, immigration and customs 
officials have little to gain from pursuing them. As a result, apart from attempts to extract 
unofficial fines and fees, returnees are left largely to their own devices — although there 
would certainly be much more interest in monitoring their arrival if they were bringing in 
firearms or drugs. 
A lack of resources limits the navy’s capacity to effectively monitor even those parts of 
Indonesia’s coastline known to be vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity. It is also 
responsible for creating an expectation that the navy, like the other branches of the armed 
forces, will seek to generate alternative streams of revenue. There is broad acknowledgment 
that the military is under-resourced and draws a considerable percentage of its operating 
budget from commercial ventures, including the provision of services to private 
enterprise.41 In the Riau Islands, this has translated into engagement in the various “sin” 
industries, like gambling and prostitution,42 but also into tacit or active support for cross-
border smuggling of goods,43 and of people. Indeed, many returnees arrive along a stretch of 
beach at Tanjung Sengkawang, the site of a navy and military barracks, which is fenced off 
and guarded by what NGO workers describe as hijau-coklat-preman (army, police and the 
mafia). The guards charge the returning migrant workers MYR5 ($1.50) to wash their feet 
after walking through the shallow waters from the boat to the shore, providing a lucrative 
source of income for navy personnel in the barracks. The fact that GAT continues to do its 
work in clear view suggests that it is tolerated by local naval authorities, perhaps because its 
activities do not directly threaten the navy’s income stream. 
Local level authorities, meanwhile, are not opposed to GAT’s efforts insofar as these efforts 
make a small contribution to dealing with the steady flow of returning migrants. Local 
authorities are concerned about the potential social costs of having large numbers of 
Indonesian migrant workers living in the islands while waiting to return to Malaysia or 
Singapore but have little capacity to manage them. At the same time, the local branches of the 
Ministry of Social Welfare — which, along with local government, was made responsible for 
housing and repatriation of returning migrant workers following the Nunukan crisis — 
struggle with the financial and logistical implications of that task. For many years, the IOM 
provided the bulk of funding available for repatriation of victims of trafficking from the 
islands to their provinces of origin. Although NGOs found it difficult to get approval for 
repatriating Indonesian migrant workers, who the IOM described as having experienced 
“thin” (tipis) cases of trafficking,44 these funds represented a significant resource. The 
Department of Social Welfare now has primary responsibility for both victims of 
trafficking and deported labour migrants, but it has no interest in funding smuggled workers 
who have not been victims of trafficking.  
Conclusion: border control, non-state actors and the state 
Although GAT’s border security work is not part of a widespread pattern of NGO activity, 
this case study provides an interesting lens through which to think about the role of non-state 
actors in maritime border control in Indonesia, and about the extent to which the activities of 
NGOs and/or private agencies support government regulation or challenge the legitimacy and 
efficacy of state regulation of borders more generally. As the literature suggests, the 
privatization of border security has been largely state-driven. Through a process of 
incorporation or privatization, states in the developed West have sought to extend their 
borders “outwards” by outsourcing border control functions. Much of the outsourcing of 
migration management has taken the form of passport and visa regulation prior to departure. 
Simultaneously, the increasing involvement of non-state actors has addressed the significant 
gaps emerging in states’ capacity to deal with the social and economic costs of the presence 
of large numbers of undocumented migrants within their borders. Rather than displacing the 
state, these public/private partnerships represent a shift in the mode of state regulation of the 
border and thus a means of supporting the state’s security functions. 
The case of GAT does not sit easily within a model that presents non-state involvement in 
border security as an extension of the Indonesian state’s border functions. Undocumented 
labour migrants from Indonesia enter into other nations illegally but, in returning to 
Indonesia, they are entering their home state. Nor could we characterize Indonesia as a failed 
state where international agencies and NGOs have stepped in to address a gap in the state’s 
capacity to manage its borders. Rather, Indonesia represents a case in which a relatively 
coherent state with an active and powerful military and an extensive bureaucracy has chosen 
not to take an active role in managing the return of its citizens who avail themselves of 
irregular migration channels. Significantly, this is not a state of affairs limited to this 
maritime border; it can also be observed at the Tawau-Nunukan crossing in East Kalimantan 
where, having picked up their official passengers, ferry services routinely stop within sight of 
the Tawau port to allow undocumented Indonesian returnees to board and again to allow 
them to alight before reaching the immigration checkpoint at Nunukan.45 In Nunukan and 
Batam, this situation represents a space not of state incapacity — as is the case with many 
crossing points on the Kalimantan land border or,46 indeed, with the “rat ports” on more 
remote islands in the Riau Archipelago — but rather a space of deliberate state absence. 
Perhaps the most important element of this case for our understanding of the relationship 
between non-state actors and the state is the attitude of institutions and individual officials to 
the phenomenon of undocumented return. Unlike the highly institutionalized “alternative” 
system through which many Indonesian labour migrants leave the Riau Islands for Singapore 
and Malaysia — what we have dubbed the aspal route47 — agents of the state have little to 
gain from facilitating the irregular return of these migrants, and so, with the exception of the 
navy, have not sought to seek rent from them. The government departments with the primary 
responsibility for preventing Indonesian citizens from landing at unofficial ports are the 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights, which has responsibility for immigration, and the 
Ministry of Finance, which has responsibility for customs. Neither has demonstrated an 
interest in those Indonesian returnees who use the services of people smugglers. This, in part, 
explains why GAT, rather than a state-sponsored form of contracting out or outsourcing, is 
the primary actor in this space. Conversely, neither ministry has expressed concern over 
GAT’s attempts to “fill the gap”, which suggests that officials do not feel threatened by 
GAT’s usurpation of their duties, or mimicry of their processes. 
Clearly, then, GAT’s activities are not seen as a challenge to the legitimacy and efficacy of 
Indonesia’s border protocols. Nor do they fill a gap by providing support for the activities of 
the state. While there is some cooperation between GAT and the Ministry of Social Welfare, 
the state functionaries most intimately involved in policing the border choose not to act on 
the information GAT passes on to them. Instead, GAT effectively operates in a space in 
which the Indonesian state has chosen to be absent, despite its obvious importance for the 
integrity of its borders. This case prompts more questions than it provides answers, but in 
doing so, presents a substantial challenge to the ways in which we conceive and assess non-
state engagement in the provision of maritime security. 
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